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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses a mode of thinking that, it is argued, is manifested in Max 
Deutscher’s oeuvre. It explores the intricacies inherent in the ‘singular thoughtfulness’ of 
Deutscher, intricacies that emerge through his use of imagery in its connection with the 
subject matter with which he deals. The paper challenges the idiom of obvious 
associations and moves towards an appreciation of Deutscher in his judicious balance of 
his experience and thinking as well as a correlative balance of certainty and uncertainty, 
all contrasted on a ground of confidence and its intensified over-confidence. The paper 
employs an imagery of its own in order to highlight Deutscher’s peculiar use of everyday 
images in his work. Thus figures as diverse as Whitehead, Proust and Sand are woven 
into the fabric both in order to support and to distinguish Deutscher’s thought. The paper 
was first presented as a fifteen minute presentation: the object here is to retain a quality of 
brevity, swiftness and economy: all features of Max Deutscher in his extensive writings. 
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JUDICIOUS JUDGMENT: A CASE FOR VERY UNUSUAL MINDS 
 
Alfred Whitehead noted: “Familiar things happen, and mankind does not bother about them. It requires a very 
unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious.”i Of course, Whitehead was (at least) referring to the 
origins of Western science wherein there was a wrenching from a previous naïve acceptance of life’s 
‘recurrences’. Be that as it may, in a similar spirit to Whitehead I will attempt to say something in this paper 
about what I see to be the ‘very unusual mind’ of Max Deutscher. That means I will need to say something 
about what Deutscher might consider as ‘the obvious’ these days, as well as to say something about what might 
constitute a ‘usual’ mind. ii Since his latest published book is on judgment I’ll start there and consider what he 
may challenge as a general naïve acceptance of the ‘recurrences’ – as repetitions – that pertain to mind and 
judgment. This challenge requires judgment to be deployed in a very particular way – judiciously I will argue – 
a judiciousness that has nothing to do with prudence and everything to do with a singular thoughtfulness.iii A 
singular thoughtfulness is what enables us to negotiate the environs in which we necessarily find ourselves: iv a 
particular engagement with those environs as the key to proper judgment.v 
 
One of Deutscher’s environs in 2007 was St Petersburg, where he attended the ballet, Swan Lake. Having come 
to expect something ‘saccharine’, with music ‘whose themes had become a satirisable cliché’, he was pleasantly 
surprised to find that ‘even the music […] was played with such confidence and drama that I felt stopped short 
in all my prejudices.’vi His pre-judice in this case was that the ballet would be mundane in the worst, stultifying 
sense: banal, or dull; to do with its recurrent quality.vii What he found instead was that the ballet, though so often 
performed, was here different. The difference in this case consisted in the ‘confidence and drama’ of ‘even the 
music’, the ‘even’ suggesting that the dancing was also performed with similar confidence and drama.  This then 
is an example of the everyday being brought into high relief, as each day – the day he attended, to be precise.viii 
And now it is a three way relief: the double manoeuvre of Deutscher in being quite matter of fact about his 
experience and his prejudice, matched with his pleasure at the boldness of a performance that might otherwise 
have been delivered in a clichéd manner. In terms then of that which might constitute the everyday or obvious or 
mundane there are at least two obvious aspects: ix x the recurrent, familiar event on the one hand and the shifting 
perception, or judgment, of that event on the other. 
 
In his work on judgment Deutscher resorts to similar possible clichés. For example: 
  
Imagine. I’m on a picnic in the park, senses flooded […] Then the images fade, replaced by the economy 
of words and symbols […] In a few words I tell all that happened. ‘Yes, he was there and yes, she …and 
the dog…and the children of course. They went for a walk in the bird sanctuary […] Thought, ‘de-
sensed’, exceeds the rate of perceptions, images and the spoken word.xi 
 
Nothing could be more ordinary or clichéd than a picnic one might think. Deutscher has swiftly transformed his 
image of a picnic into high art: a swiftness which sits alongside either a slow monotony or a hazy laziness. We 
see two swiftnesses: one, the sudden flooding of the senses overtaken by ‘economy’; the other his recapturing of 
the sensory moment; and yet another: his jettison of ‘even’ the sensory moment as thought exceeds everything 
else.xii 
 
Since many of us would probably think that we are singularly thoughtful, the unusualness of Deutscher’s mind, I 
will hope to show, is in the way he utilizes ‘the obvious’ whilst at the same time saying something about it: 
getting a little distance – being both present and absent at the same time, both an actor and an observer.xiii That 
is to say, Deutscher’s mind is not unusual in being above or outside the everyday. Rather it is unusual in that he 
is everyday – now as relaxed, matter-of-fact – in his philosophical deliberations, which largely rely on recurrent 
events as the images that give his thinking the empirical substance they require.xiv But to say he is relaxed and 
matter-of-fact is not to say that he is slow. On the contrary his dual relation to the everyday requires lightning 
reflexes of thought: a two way manoeuvre. His then is a double manoeuvre which brings the everyday into high 
relief; while the usual mind might be said to keep the everyday in low relief: unimportant, destined to be hidden 
away from view – now something is relegated (as hidden) where it was previously manifested. Paradoxically it 
would be the usual mind that seeks to uncover the (now) hidden: a one-way manoeuvre. Unusual then matches 
with the obvious and its varied complexities; usual matches with the obscured from view, whether sensorial or 
intellectual.xv  
 
The unusual mind requires a dual rapidity so as not to become mired in obscurity. There is a constant flight that 
looks like a tangential escaping. The escaping however is more to do with being sceptical about surety, usually 
sought in that which is obscured from view. Such surety would be the ultimate trap for Deutscher. For just as the 
world escapes us we need to escape from the surety by means of which the world presents itself to us. It is here 
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that Deutscher aligns himself with Sartre, at least for a moment or two. In discussing Sartre’s ‘Qualities’ in 
Genre and Void, Deutscher renders Sartre’s ‘escaping being’ as: 
 
How things are for us opens up what the world is. If there were no ways the world was for us, we should 
know nothing of it. Yet as fast as the world shows itself we become suspicious of what we have been 
permitted to see, fearing that we have come to know the world-as-it-is-for-us rather than the-world-as-it-
is-in-itself.xvi 
 
As early as Subjecting and Objecting, he is even talking about judgment in these terms: 
 
For all this insistence on the necessity of judgement, of deciding that certain matters are so and others 
not, as a condition of reason and not a mere dogmatism, the subjective mode has its place in all our 
attempts to deal with what we see and think. To deny this is to deny the place of wondering, pondering, 
mulling things over, softening one’s line and attitude to be receptive to what one does not yet 
understand, to what seems perhaps, to flout outrageously what one knows clearly and full well.xvii 
 
This passage appears under the heading: The importance of being not too confident. And yet there is a strong 
sense of confidence in Deutscher’s work, and a respect for confidence, as we saw with his comments on the 
Swan Lake ballet. He is confident in admiring those philosophers who are confidently undecided in the face of 
certainty. Those like Le Dœuff, Irigaray and Beauvoir. Of course there is nothing undecided in Sartre it would 
seem – well, on the face of it: any indecision would be tantamount to bad faith, or explained away in the matrix 
of ‘being-for-others’ and the “Other’s being-there.”xviii Deutscher however is tolerant of Sartre also and 
concludes:  
 
Certainly, we can observe that all of them – Sartre, Beauvoir, Le Dœuff and Irigaray – in their different 
ways – tend towards an ontology that would not divide person from body. Such ontology of an 
observable bodily consciousness must then take care to respect the interiority of a person’s life as 
something always only partly known and understood – whether by themselves or by another.xix 
 
Yet whilst we may only partly know and understand we get on with things. It is the degree to which we get on 
with things that is important to Deutscher: confident but not too confident, judging but not judgmental, critical 
but not criticising. And all these attitudes are the same yet different. Confidence is about trust. The French has a 
nice opposition here: xx confiance and méfiance – trust and mistrust. This opposition finds its parallel in 
connaissance and méconnaissance – knowing and not knowing. Lacan however will show that méconnaissance 
is a false not knowing,xxi similar to Sartre’s Bad Faith. I think though that these oppositions would also be too 
easy for Deutscher: perhaps for him the oppositions themselves serve to cover over the question rather than 
allow it to remain manifest. It is not doubt – real, conscious, or otherwise – that he will see as opposed to 
confidence but rather a too confident attitude. That means that his confidence is a softer, more malleable thing. 
In Subjecting and Objecting he talks about 
 
a reasonable confidence [that] allows one to include within one’s observation and judgements what still 
is, in tone, an openly concessionary and further-observation-and-discussion-permitting “It seems…”, “I 
feel that…” In dogmatism, one thinks that the facts, the principles, the theory, speak for themselves.xxii 
 
Since Deutscher has here related confidence and judgment, let’s see if the equation on confidence can be applied 
to judgment, and also to its correlative faculty critique (a critical enterprise), for I might suggest that these two 
are much the same. The words critique and critic hail from Greek stems that seem to my untutored eye to 
obviously imply the art of judgment.xxiii What would be the usual words to describe someone who does not judge 
or critique? Uncritical would fit, but not non-judgmental for that is something entirely different. So let’s 
suppose that, following the equation above, Deutscher’s judgment, as critical attitude, is soft and malleable. 
Uncritical would not be opposed to it; rather a too critical attitude. A too critical attitude would be the opposite 
of good judgment and would indeed be an indicator of poor judgment. Too critical would be on a par with too 
confident. Too confident, as we have seen, is tantamount to dogmatism. Le Dœuff of course would say that we 
need to employ good judgment in our critical enterprises – for her when it comes to critique it is not really a 
matter of too but rather one of how.xxiv That how is directly related to judgment when, in a discussion on Sartre 
and concerning her everyday or ordinary experience, she notes: 
 
I long remained blind to objective and politicizable data. But very early, one aspect of relations between 
men and women frightened me and this was the non-reciprocity of looks and judgements, which I again 
encountered in Sartre’s writings, but which I had already met elsewhere.xxv  
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‘How am I thinking?’ might be the critical question for Le Dœuff.xxvi This is an important question for Hannah 
Arendt also.xxvii But here I see another point of difference with Deutscher. 
 
For Deutscher, judgment is not a critical enterprise. There are many places in his last book that show judgment 
to be an emerging enterprise. And it is an emerging social enterprise. There are always others involved in my 
world. Those others may be ones who have come before us in time or who stand before us right now. One such 
person I am reminded of in this context is George Sand.xxviii Belinda Jack’s fascinating biography summed up 
neatly an attitude to judgment that could just as well fit with Deutscher’s enterprise:  
 
Sand has become increasingly interested, not in judgement, but in observation. She felt her anger at 
injustice to be less certain [and here she is talking about a particular kind of judgment – but judgment 
nonetheless]. It has been almost completely replaced by a desire for understanding. She felt privileged to 
be close to people, close to their inner lives, and was instantly fascinated by the range of human 
experience.xxix 
 
Deutscher also is fascinated by ‘the range of human experience.’ He looks backwards in order to look forwards 
and he takes a look around. He looks around himself to those and the thinking of those who are his closest 
associates and at those who might not be so. He stands before them to give them an adequate hearing.xxx 
Standing before is not a static pose but requires constant movement backwards and forwards – around and about 
– by means of the rapid dual thought processes of a Max Deutscher. 
 
This manner of proceeding is another take on Deutscher’s ‘conversal’ where he is in two minds as he absents 
himself in order to mind me. xxxi  He is present in his absence, and a conversal has its connection with correction 
(com, con, co, cor, all connoting with or togetherxxxii) as it leads in the direction of judgment. Perhaps we should 
rather say we con-judge, judge together the coherence of our thinking.xxxiii This is not a conjugation, which has 
the different connotation of joining or yolking. Rather, it is a judging together in our separateness or difference: 
not a joint judgment then, or a conjoint judgment, for they would both imply that we were joined. It is a 
judgment whereby we stand side by side or face to face or vis-à-vis.xxxiv We judge in being absent from 
ourselves but present to each other. It is in our absence that we can indeed be present for we are not so closely 
tied to ourselves that we fail to take notice of those around us. In this sense we are engaged in a commonality, 
though not necessarily a common project. It is through the common that we become uncommon. And now I am 
meaning the common to be the familiar. The meaning of the word common easily extends itself beyond shared 
experiences to encompass the everyday or familiar. Antonio Negri utilizes this inherent mobility of the word 
when he states: “The construction of different worlds takes place through what is common – what is common to 
humanity.”xxxv But now, common moves beyond itself to uncommon difference. Those different worlds would 
be uncommon, unfamiliar.xxxvi 
 
A final comment: the titles of Deutscher’s two recent books are very telling. Genre and Void: Looking Back at 
Sartre and Beauvoir – looking back at those who stood before us: before in both senses of the word – as present 
and absent. Judgment after Arendt – judgment after: judgment which comes before is now done after. This is not 
to forget that the word after also means in the mode of. More double play in order to be not too confident. But 
sufficiently confident to be able to move from what is now evident as the complex system of the everyday: 
something which might be judged as obvious, familiar, and at times clichéd. Max Deutscher’s art is to immerse 
himself in the imagery of the everyday in order for his thought to take bold flight. His Swan Lake experience 
was an apt metaphor for his philosophical attitude: a complex metaphor combining his experience of the ballet 
with the story of Swan Lake, which is all about uncertainty, swiftness and slowness, and a final, certain 
confidence. My double movement in the title, which is there to stress the repetitive quality of the familiar, and 
not to be taken as a mere tautology, signposts the way he moves from the familiar to the novel: from the obvious 
to the ...xxxvii  
 
What then finally characterizes Deutscher’s thought? I started the essay with a singular thoughtfulness as being 
the crucial element of judicious judgment. As the essay progressed it became evident that the singularity 
encompassed a dual action. That dual action was itself multiple in that it connoted presence and absence, 
slowness and rapidity, and a confidence that coexists with uncertainty. The question of the modifier of intensity, 
the word too, also arose, leaving room for more thinking, or, as we encountered from Deutscher a long time ago: 
“wondering, pondering, mulling things over”.xxxviii 
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